Standing Committee E

[Mr. Alan Hurst in the Chair]

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill

Clause 45 - Detention by Secretary of State

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 238, in page 24, line 40, leave out subsection 8.
 Welcome back to the Chair, Mr. Hurst. We come now to the important aspects of detention and removal. As the Minister will know, detention is a power to be used sparingly and only by those who are trained to use it. Given that the power of detention is now extended further, not only to immigration officers and the judiciary, but to the Secretary of State and, by definition, his caseworkers, I hope that Minister can confirm that they will be fully trained in all such matters. 
 This probing amendment would delete subsection (8), which is unsatisfactory as the Bill does not explain it properly. The meaning of ''of a particular kind'' is not clear, nor is the meaning of ''of that kind''. In fact, the more I read the subsection, the more mystified I am about its meaning. Would the Minister be kind enough to explain it?

Rosie Winterton: The Government accept the comments of the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) about the power to detain. It is a serious matter that raises important issues. The problem is that, although the Immigration Act 1971 had a clear division of powers and duties in that respect—immigration officers dealt with people seeking to enter the United Kingdom and the Secretary of State dealt with those already here—the distinction has since become rather blurred, especially as a consequence of certain changes made under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
 New section 3A of the 1971 Act allows the Secretary of State to grant, refuse or vary leave to enter the UK in the circumstances set out under the Immigration (Leave to Enter) Order 2001, a function that was previously reserved to immigration officers. Section 10 of the 1999 Act transfers to an immigration officer the power previously held by the Secretary of State to remove overstayers and certain other types of immigration offender. 
 Our practical difficulty is that in the case of, say, an illegal entrant who claims asylum, a caseworker in the integrated casework directorate can decide the asylum application on behalf of the Secretary of State, but cannot authorise detention if that is considered appropriate. Furthermore, the caseworker cannot authorise release subject to reporting conditions in other cases. The file has to be passed to an 
 immigration officer to make that decision and then passed back. The position is different for an on-entry applicant. The ICD caseworker can authorise temporary admission subject to conditions, but cannot authorise detention. 
 The clause will overcome what we believe is an inefficient way to proceed. It will allow the Secretary of State to authorise detention and grant release subject to conditions in the following cases: when the Secretary of State has power to set removal directions, and when he has power to grant or refuse leave to enter. We are trying to simplify the process. 
 I understand the hon. Gentleman's points about the importance of such decisions. They will always be reviewed by a senior officer, and I confirm that appropriate training will continue to be provided, although in many senses the criteria will not differ. It is the group of people to whom they apply who will be slightly different. 
 If the amendment were accepted, no minor who is liable to removal as an illegal entrant under section 10 of the 1999 Act powers or following a refusal of leave to enter could be detained on the Secretary of State's authority. However, an immigration officer's power to detain someone under the age of 18 would not be affected. Obviously, detaining a child is not done lightly, but it is sometimes necessary to allow the removal of a family group to take place smoothly. It may also be necessary in other exceptional circumstances, such as when a child arrives unaccompanied late at night and it is impossible for local social services to make suitable arrangements. Detention in such cases would usually be overnight while alternative care arrangements were made. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked for examples of decisions ''of a particular kind''. That refers to the sort of decisions allowed under the clause: for example, subsection (2)(c) allows detention pending a decision by the Secretary of State to give legal directions. Under subsection (8), the power to detain under subsection (2)(c) can be exercised pending a decision by the Secretary of State to set removal directions when he has grounds to suspect that he may make a decision to set removal directions. 
 I emphasise that detention in family cases would be used only when necessary and not for an excessive period. As I said, limiting the power to detain under the clause in the manner proposed would not prevent the detention of a person under 18 by an immigration officer using powers contained elsewhere, in the 1971 Act. I hope that with that explanation the hon. Member for Woking will consider withdrawing the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: I am greatly assisted by the Minister's response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 291, in page 24, line 46, at end add— 
'( ) Section 53 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c.33) (bail) shall be amended as follows— 
 (a) at the end of subsection (1) add ''or under section 45 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002'', and 
 (b) at the end of subsection (3)(a) add ''or under section 45 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002''. 
 ( ) Section 23(2) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c.24) (detention of suspected international terrorist) shall be amended as follows— 
 (a) omit ''and'' after paragraph (a), and 
 (b) after paragraph (b) add— 
 '', and 
 (c) section 45 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention by Secretary of State).'''.—[Ms Rosie Winterton.
]

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 237, in page 24, line 46, at end add—
'(10) For the purposes of this section no person under the age of 18 shall be detained in accordance with its provisions'.
 Under the amendment, no person under the age of 18 would be detained. It is a probing amendment. I understand that in the real world minors have to be detained from time to time, albeit only in the most exceptional circumstances, whereas the amendment would prevent the Government from detaining minors in any circumstance. 
 The Government have often said that minors should not be detained, but more family detention places are being built. The half of Yarl's Wood that burned down provided 450 places for families. I remind the Government that they signed the United Nations convention on the rights of the child, but to the great upset of many non-governmental organisations and others, the Government maintain their reservation on article 22 so that children can be detained. 
 The Ministers will have read the special report entitled ''Refugees in Britain'' by Martin Bright in The Observer on Sunday 12 August 2001. He gave many examples of youngsters who ended up in adult accommodation—some were even detained in prison. I will not go into details, but there were some sad and sorry tales. The 1997 detention instructions state that minors are 
''unsuitable for detention in Immigration Service Accommodation''.
 However, we still detain minors in the United Kingdom, contrary to the convention on the rights of the child and UNHCR guidelines. 
 The Minister will probably not be able to tell me how many minors are currently detained—the figure may vary from week to week. However, I seek from her an assurance that the Government will strive mightily never to detain minors, and an undertaking to write to me as soon as she can with an update on the numbers involved. Will she also tell the Committee that it is the Government's intention to reduce the number of minors in detention to zero or the nearest possible number to zero?

Rosie Winterton: For the reasons I have already given, I cannot give a complete assurance that minors will never be detained. In some cases, detention is necessary in the best interests of the child—for example, overnight detention. Minors may also be detained when appeals have been exhausted and a family has been refused asylum.
 It is difficult to state the exact number of children detained, because that number changes almost daily. Although it is not possible to give accurate figures, I stress that we will do all that we can: for example, in cases involving unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, the Government will seek to ensure that local authorities provide the necessary facilities for them so that, as often as possible, they need not be detained overnight. 
 I cannot accept the amendment. If the intention is to prevent the detention of anyone under 18, the amendment would not achieve it. It would prevent detention by a Secretary of State, but not by an immigration officer. Again, I stress that detention of minors is not done lightly, but it cannot be wholly avoided. With that reassurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Humfrey Malins: The purpose of my amendment was to flag up the Opposition's concern about the detention of minors, which has troubled us for a long time. I listened to what the Minister said, and although it was not entirely satisfactory, I understand to some extent the logic of her argument. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 - Escorts

Rosie Winterton: I beg to move amendment No. 252, in page 25, line 8, leave out 'arrests' and inserts 'detains'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 255.

Rosie Winterton: Clause 46 amends schedule 2(17) of the 1971 Act. It will give detainee custody officers a limited power of entry to private premises in order to search detained persons prior to escorting them to a place of detention. People who are being taken to a place of detention must be searched before they are transported, most obviously to ensure that they are not carrying weapons or other dangerous items. That is to ensure the safety and security of the escort, the public and the detained persons. The power to search detained persons is provided in paragraph 2 of schedule 13 to the 1999 Act.
 At present, escorting officers cannot enter private premises other than by consent, and when consent is not given, the detained person has to be taken to the nearest police station to be searched by the escort. That causes unnecessary delay, imposes a burden on police resources, and can be needlessly distressing to detainees. The clause removes those problems by ensuring that the search can take place at the detainee's address. 
 Government amendments Nos. 252 and 255 are linked and merely rectify a drafting error. To be consistent with escorts' existing power to search a detained person, which is contained in paragraph 2 of 
 schedule 13 to the 1999 Act, the power to enter private premises will be triggered by the detention rather than by the arrest of a person. The amendments are minor and will ensure that the trigger for the power to enter private premises is consistent with escorts' existing power to search a detained person. I hope that the Committee will accept that these are minor drafting amendments and will accept them accordingly.

Richard Allan: I seek further clarification from the Minister on the difference between arrest and detention. I understand where the Government are coming from, and under later amendments we shall discuss our general concerns about escort officers carrying out that kind of work. There is a significant difference between an arrest situation and a detention situation. I understand that when an arrest occurs, a range of other safeguards kick in, in particular the codes of practice in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which, as the Minister knows, apply not only to police officers but to immigration service officers.
 We are concerned that there might be a lowering of the standards of behaviour expected from, or mandated upon, those carrying out such functions. In particular, I question whether the proposed shift from the word ''arrests'' to ''detains'' will change the distinction between arrest and detention in any way, because escorting officers will not be carrying out a formal arrest. Will that disapply procedures such as those under PACE that offer safeguards to the person who is being taken away?

Rosie Winterton: No. I hope that I can give some reassurance on that subject. At the moment, if an escort accompanying an immigration or police officer has a warrant to detain a person, they cannot search that person there and then, because they do not have the power to assist in detaining somebody. The person can only be searched at a police station, because the officers would not want to carry out the search out on the street, which is what they would have to do if they did not have the consent of the person to enter the premises.
 In respect of detention—which is different from arrest—we are trying to introduce a system that enables the escort to enter the premises and conduct a search there and then, rather than having to go to the police station to do that. The escort must conduct the search themselves if the detention and escort process are to be carried out in a lawful fashion. I hope that that clarifies the situation, and reassures the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan). 
 Amendment agreed to.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 262, in page 25, line 9, leave out 'if need be by force'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will convenient to consider amendment No. 236, in page 25, line 9, after 'by', insert 'reasonable'.

Richard Allan: The amendment addresses our principal concerns about what might arise in the cases that the Government envisage wherein detainee custody officers effectively take over—or accept—a broader range of powers, which historically have largely been
 exercised by police officers and immigration service officers. Our principal concerns are about whether the standards that apply to detainee custody officers will be as high as those that apply to police and immigration service officers.
 As I have said, police officers are subject to a range of procedures when they carry out forcible entries and searches of individuals. Those procedures are well established in law. Immigration service officers, through their codes of practice, have effectively taken up the PACE codes of practice. We seek assurances that codes of practice that are equivalent to those of PACE will be applied to detainee custody officers who carry out such tasks. 
 With regard to detainee custody officers who take an individual away, past experience suggests that it is reasonable to expect that things might occasionally go awry. What kind of complaints mechanism will be in place if and when something goes wrong? The police and immigration service have complaints mechanisms in place, but we have concerns about the accountability of anyone else who might conduct such tasks. 
 It is likely that the detainee custody officers will not be public employees. It is reasonable to assume that the Government intend to employ private sector firms to engage in that work—I would like to hear whether Ministers have something else in mind, or to receive confirmation that they envisage private sector security firms will carry out this work. Every individual has the right to expect both decent standards to be applied and a means of redress if they are not, but that could be far more difficult to ensure in respect of a private sector firm than in respect of the police or immigration services. 
 I know of complaints that have been made against court officers employed from the private sector. There is a public expectation that court officers should conform to high standards and that there should be a clear route of accountability, regardless of whether they are employed by the private or the public sector, so that blame is not placed on a private sector manager rather than the public sector authority taking the blame and accepting responsibility for investigating any problems. 
 We are also concerned about the extent to which forcible entries and search events can affect a wider group of people than their immediate subjects. Often, the impact will not be limited to the individual who has been taken into detention. The proposal that forcible entry can take place will affect not only the person who is liable to be detained, but other people, who might include British citizens if the place that is entered is a person's private premises and other people are present at the time. 
 I do not want to create too large a distinction, but British citizens have an expectation in law that protections apply. Although the Government may be able to justify the overriding necessity to remove an individual detainee, people would find it difficult to accept that at the expense of the rights and liberties of those who are present in or who own the building involved. The worst-case scenario is that of a private-
 sector organisation making a forcible entry and people who are worried and who want to raise their legitimate rights in law finding it difficult to obtain redress for what occurred. Amendment No. 262 would remove the forcible entry provision. 
 I hope that the Government will find amendment No. 236 more acceptable. A similar amendment was debated when the Committee on the 1999 legislation discussed similar powers for immigration officers. It gave rise to one of the rare moments of excitement in Committee when an Opposition amendment is accepted. That amendment proposed that the word ''reasonable'' should preface the word ''force'' when considering entry into premises. The then Minister, the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. O'Brien), accepted that the reasonableness test should and always would apply to any use of force. 
 If the Minister cannot accept amendment No. 262, I hope that she will accept amendment No. 236. The phrase ''reasonable force'' is well known in law. If we extend the power from immigration service officers to people who are more at arm's length—detainee custody officers—there are stronger grounds for including the word ''reasonable'' because that would give people security about the way in which force would be used. 
 I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response on those points. The matter is of considerable concern to us because of the potential for things to go wrong and the possibility of the unfortunate consequence of individuals feeling that they cannot get redress. Situations may develop that should be handled by the highly trained professional officers in the police force: although I know that the police are reluctant to carry out a large amount of immigration work because it detracts from their other duties, they are trained to deal with tense situations in which physical contact is required. People in the immigration service are similarly trained, and we do not want a diminution of the professionalism of the service that will apply to tense and difficult situations.

Humfrey Malins: I rise to speak to amendment No. 236, which in fact stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends.

Richard Allan: I apologise to the hon. Gentleman. I was confusing the amendments.

Humfrey Malins: I entirely forgive the hon. Gentleman. I am pleased to have his support.
 The tragic death of Joy Gardner teaches us that we should proceed with huge sensitivity in such areas. Will the Minister tell us more about detainee custody officers? I am anxious to know what training such people will have, whether they will be in uniform, the powers that they will have and whether they will be employees of private security firms. We must proceed with sensitivity if such persons may enter premises, especially if they may do so by force. 
 The clause does not limit the amount of force that a detainee custody officer may use. My knowledge of criminal law—you too will know this from your 
 experience, Mr. Hurst—suggests that if the word ''force'' is used in statute, it is often preceded by the word ''reasonable''. It is an absolute canon of the law on self-defence that one may use force to defend oneself provided that it is reasonable. That is laid out specifically in all directions that judges give to juries. 
 The Minister might say that there is an inference to be drawn that the force used must be reasonable, but that is not what the Bill states. It contains no reference to the requirement to use reasonable force, even though there are many other statutory references to reasonable force. The Minister loses absolutely nothing by agreeing to my proposal to include ''reasonable''. I am certain that the briefing from her officials does not say, ''Resist at all costs.'' Indeed, it might say, ''Resist mildly to begin with, but if the argument is persuasive, accept it.'' I hope that that is what the Minister's briefing says. 
 We all know that the police and the immigration service are subject to certain disciplinary procedures, codes of practice and all the rest of it; that is as it should be. We want to know that the position of a detainee custody officer is similar in a world where ample protection is given to all parties concerned. The force used must be reasonable—it cannot be unreasonable—so why can the clause not say so?

Rosie Winterton: Let me deal first with amendment No. 236. We believe that the amendment is redundant because the only force that may lawfully be used is that which is reasonable. That is explicit in both the clause and paragraph 17(2) of schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. We are mirroring the provisions of that Act, and although we have considered alternatives, we believe that it is acceptable to use the same wording. Quite simply, if the force is unreasonable, it is likely to be unlawful.

Humfrey Malins: I think that the Minister said that, if the force is unreasonable, it is lawful—

Rosie Winterton: Unlawful.

Humfrey Malins: The Minister may have meant to say that if the force is unreasonable it is unlawful. What consequences would flow from that?

Rosie Winterton: I shall come to complaints in due course, but obviously if the action were unlawful, the person would have broken the law and would be liable for his action in the same way that anyone else would be in those circumstances.

Richard Allan: I want to encourage the Minister to look more favourably on the amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Woking. She has just spoken about mirroring the 1971 Act; I wonder whether she will offer a commitment to look at what happened in the 1999 Act? At the time, the Government said that the word ''reasonable'' was redundant, but to reassure the Opposition Members they included it in the Bill. The same argument may apply now. For the sake of public reassurance, it would be better if the Bill stated ''reasonable force'' rather than simply ''force''.

Rosie Winterton: I was about to say that although we remain satisfied that there is adequate protection, we will certainly consider instances such as the one to
 which the hon. Gentleman referred. At present, we are extremely satisfied that it is not necessary to add ''reasonable''. We would have to look at any repercussions that there might be for Acts when the word ''unreasonable'' is not inserted. I hope that that reassures him.
 Amendment No. 262 would make the clause inconsistent with paragraph 17(2) of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, to which it is directly linked. The clause gives detainee custody officers a limited power of entry to private premises to search detained persons before escorting them to a place of detention. As we said, our problem is that there are currently unnecessary delays, as police officers have a larger burden. The experience can needlessly distress detainees, as they must be taken to the nearest police station so that the escort can search them. 
 A detainee escort's power of entry is limited. It would be exercised only when escorts accompanied police or immigration officers to premises for which a justice of the peace has issued a warrant. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam asked how escorts will be held accountable for their actions. As I said, escorts are as accountable in law for their actions as anyone else. That would remain the case, even given the limited power of entry. They are responsible for escorting detained persons safely and securely to and from places of detention. They are detainee custody officers, who are certified under section 154 of the 1999 Act to perform escort and custodial functions. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked about qualifications. The Secretary of State issues a certificate of authorisation only when he is satisfied that the applicant is a fit and proper person to perform the authorised functions of a certified DCO and has received training to an approved standard. The training covers the skills and competences necessary to perform escort functions, including safe use of control and restraint techniques, first aid, race awareness, suicide awareness, child care and child protection. The escorts are employed by Wackenhut UK Ltd, which is the immigration and nationality directorate's contracted service provider of in-country escorting of detained persons. 
 Complaints about an escort's actions are directed to the immigration service's escort contract monitor. Under schedule 13(1) of the 1999 Act, the escort contract monitor is required to investigate and report to the Secretary of State any allegation made against an escorting officer about any act done or failure to act while escorting a detained person. The DCO certificate may be suspended during such an investigation and subsequently revoked in appropriate cases. I emphasise that in addition to that robust complaints procedure, any escort is answerable in law for his or her actions. 
 On restrictions on searching detainees, rule 7 of the detention centre rules 2001 applies to detained persons when they are taken into custody. That includes searches by escorts as well as those conducted on reception at removal centres. The rule requires that a detained person shall be searched in as seemly a manner as is consistent with discovering anything concealed. I understand the points made by the hon. 
 Gentlemen, but I hope that they will be reassured by the fact that the clause merely enables escorts to conduct searches on premises, as opposed to a detainee or person who will be detained having to be taken to a police station to be searched. Escorts will always be accompanied by a police constable and immigration officer who will carry a warrant that will enable the escort to do the searching there. 
 With those reassurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam will withdraw the amendment.

Richard Allan: I am grateful for the Minister's considered response, in particular her offer to re-examine the use of the word ''reasonable'' as used in the amendment of the hon. Member for Woking. It will be better if we return to the subject after that reconsideration has taken place, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 46, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47 - Detention centres: change of name

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 263, in page 25, line 22, leave out paragraph (a).
 It is this amendment that confused me in the last group. Amendment No. 263 following No. 236 is too much for my brain to grasp at this time of day. 
 The amendment is important because we are concerned about the Government's redesignation of detention centres as removal centres. We do not perceive the logic, unless it is Government window-dressing. All the evidence suggests that if the current pattern of detention continues, the individuals detained in the centres will not necessarily be those who are about to be removed. The redefinition as removal centres will allow the Government to talk up their removals policy by classifying anyone in the centres as someone with whom they are dealing from a removals point of view. 
 Significant numbers of people are involved. At the end of December 2001, there were 1,410 asylum seekers in detention, and the Home Office estimated in March 2000 that some 15,000 people were detained under 1999 Act powers. Of people in the system the end of March 1999, 60 per cent. of asylum detainees were awaiting an initial decision, 25 per cent. were awaiting the result of an appeal and 15 per cent. were awaiting the result of a further challenge to documentation for removal. In other words, a large number of people are being held in detention centres—lawfully so, under to the Government's regime, although we could debate whether any individual should be detained—pending initial hearings rather than pending removal. 
 It seems perverse to reclassify as a removal centre a detention centre that mainly holds people who have been detained for perfectly good reasons under the 1999 Act but who are not awaiting removal. The reclassification can only point to some other agenda, one that allows the Government to talk about dealing 
 with removals, which we accept are a difficult issue, despite the fact that the removal centres will not hold people who are at the point of removal. 
 We are worried about how being in what is deemed to be a removal centre will affect those held. What message is sent to an asylum seeker in a removal centre who is awaiting an initial hearing if, even before his case has been heard, he is effectively—by the name of the centre if not in law—classified as someone who is awaiting removal? That could cause the Government additional problems if they have to detain people who are waiting for a hearing to take place. It might be more straightforward for all parties if such people were detained in a detention centre, rather than forced into a removal centre where they may feel less co-operative because of the message sent out and the tone of the system. 
 Taking someone to hearings from a removal centre might send a message to those who will make decisions about that person—a message that classifies those held in accommodation centres as ''the good guys'', unlike those held in removal centres. That sends a strong message, even though no logic is involved. Many of the reasons for detention involve uncertainty and do not necessarily imply that the detainee has a less valid asylum claim than a person held in an accommodation centre. Having two routes into hearings—one from a removal centre and the other from an accommodation centre—will create an additional negative message about the person held in the removal centre. We do not believe that that is merited if that person is, as we believe many people will continue to be, awaiting initial decisions. 
 I shall be interested to hear the Minister's comments on the logic behind the redesignation and whether the Government intend the pattern of detentions to change. Perhaps the fact that he is awaiting initial approval could be a valid reason to hold a person in an accommodation centre rather than a detention centre. Will the proportion of people awaiting removals increase, or is the new name a simple reclassification that does not change the composition of the population held in the removal centres?

Angela Eagle: Our purpose in renaming detention centres removal centres is to reinforce the key role that detention plays in the removal of those who have no lawful basis to stay in this country. It does not signal a change of function for such centres, which will remain designated places of detention for the purposes of immigration legislation; nor does it signal a change in the powers to detain.
 The amendment would restrict the use of detention in a removal centre to certain classes of people, such as those who at the time of their detention could not lawfully be removed from the United Kingdom, those who are removed within two months of their detention, or those who are over 18. It would mean that we would have to release people in spite of the 
 evidence used to put them in detention—people whom we fear would abscond or are close to being removed. For example, we would be unable to detain an asylum seeker whose claim or appeal was outstanding. That would cause chaos in the system. 
 I assume that the hon. Gentleman, like the rest of the Committee, wants a system wherein the failure of an asylum claim—the person is not granted any other form of leave to remain—ultimately results in an outcome different from that of a claim that ends in someone being granted refugee status. Otherwise, the hon. Gentleman should tell me the point of the system.

Richard Allan: I was going to elaborate on subsequent amendments that relate to the question of who should be held in detention centres. At this stage, I merely wanted to probe the issue of the naming of the centres, rather than raise other issues that relate to a subsequent group of amendments.

Angela Eagle: I have explained why the Bill will rename detention centres removal centres: it is to reinforce the role that detention plays in the removal of those who have no lawful basis to stay here. That includes not only asylum seekers but overstayers and people who have fallen foul of the immigration rules and are due to be removed. If that is the answer that the hon. Gentleman wanted, that is the one that I give. I will answer the rest of his questions when we debate his next group of amendments.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for that response, which was not entirely unanticipated. There is still a major point of difference. It is not in the interests of good, open and transparent government to call something a removal centre when, as the Minister said, the policy on who is to be detained is not being changed and most of the people in the centres are not awaiting removal. We might return to that issue. In order to have a proper debate on the next interesting group of amendments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 235, in page 25, line 26, after 'persons', insert—
'whom the Home Office is lawfully entitled to remove'.

Alan Hurst: With this we will take the following amendments: No. 264, in page 25, line 26, after 'persons', insert—
'who are removable within the next two months'.
 Amendment No. 265, in page 25, line 26, after 'persons', insert— 
'over the age of eighteen'.

Humfrey Malins: What is in a name? A removal centre is not a removal centre under the Bill. It should be what it says it is. On 14 February, there was a ghastly fire in Yarl's Wood caused by arson. At that time, Yarl's Wood held 380 persons of whom only 294 were due to be removed; the other 86 were current asylum seekers. There is a great deal of potential for confusion about who is in what establishment.
 Will the Minister give the Committee her best up-to-date figures on the total number of removals from the United Kingdom from January to December 2001? 
 Will she also tell us whether the Government are sticking to their target of 35,000 removals per year? If so, when will they be on line to achieve that target? The Immigration Advisory Service tells me that Ministers have confirmed that the function of removal centres is no different from that of detention centres, as they used to be called: such centres will continue to house persons who have claimed asylum but not received an initial decision, whom the Home Office cannot lawfully remove. 
 The effect on an asylum seeker who has not yet been given an initial decision but is sent to a removal centre could be severe. It is likely to engender fear and cynicism about how seriously the claim is being considered. The change in name is ill judged. The Home Office may simply be trying to send a clear message to the public that the Government are serious about removal, in which case, let us hear the figures. 
 Other objections to the clause come from the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which objects to the redesignation of detention centres as removal centres for the same reason that I outlined—it is inaccurate. Many people held in detention centres are not liable for removal in the near future. Many have not had their initial application determined, and some are not returnable at all in the foreseeable future because of upheaval in their country of origin. 
 The redesignation will not encourage detainees to regard the process of seeking immigration status as fair and will tend to undermine trust in the independent Immigration Appellate Authority. If a detainee is placed in a removal centre when the application is made, the implicit message is that the application is doomed to failure. The name is badly chosen. The redesignation may be designed to give the impression that the Government are increasing their ability to remove those who do not qualify for asylum or for leave to enter or remain, in which case, let us see what progress has been made. 
 My amendments would do justice by ensuring that such removal centres could be used only to house people who are to be removed. It is important to flag up the issue and to find out from the Minister why the change has been made.

Cheryl Gillan: The National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux and the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants have expressed the same objections as those that were expressed by the organisations mentioned by my hon. Friend. Does he agree that the renaming will cause much anxiety for people whose first language might not be English and who therefore might not understand the relevant nuances, so that they will think that they are being put in a place that only houses people who are to be removed? That will double the anxiety of a group of vulnerable people.

Humfrey Malins: My hon. Friend is right. Not only will the measure cause anxiety, but it will cause it to be felt by a group of vulnerable people. They will make their applications and find themselves being sent to a removal centre, which will make them scratch their heads.
 I do not understand why the Minister is doing this, which is why I have proposed the amendment.

Neil Gerrard: Every time I hear the hon. Member for Woking speak from the Conservative Front Bench, I am astounded at how far his party appears to have moved in such a short time. It seems like only five minutes ago that the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) was speaking from the Home Office brief and suggesting that every single asylum seeker should be locked up the minute they stepped off a boat or a plane.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman has a serious reputation in the field of asylum and immigration, and he knows that Conservative Committee members are trying their best to be thoughtful and constructive, and to contribute in a decent and workmanlike manner. I therefore feel a bit sad that he is teasing me. I hope that he will recognise our sincerity and not tease us too much.

Neil Gerrard: I always welcome sinners who repent. I acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman has approached the Committee—and the entire Bill—in a constructive manner, and I do not wish to be churlish about what he has been saying about this issue for quite some time.
 Like many other hon. Members, I have been concerned for a while about the way that detention is used in connection with immigration and asylum cases. I do not argue for one moment that detention should never be used. That is the case not only in asylum matters. I recall an immigration case in which a woman was claiming to be someone when it was blatantly obvious that she was not that person because that person was dead, yet the woman refused to admit who she really was. I acknowledge that sometimes one has to deal with difficult people. However, in the area of asylum, there has always been a concern that far too many people have been detained before an initial decision is made about their claim. Several hon. Members have already mentioned that. 
 It is difficult to know precisely what happens in many such cases because, unfortunately, the Home Office no longer keeps the relevant statistics. Three or four years ago it was possible to get statistics that showed what had happened to people who had been detained—whether they had been granted asylum, or exceptional leave, or had their claim refused, or won appeals, or whatever. It appears that those statistics are no longer available. I do not know why. 
 If a decision to detain someone were taken, one would assume that there were good reasons for it. One would expect a pretty high failure rate of asylum claims among people who were detained. However, when those statistics were available, they clearly showed that quite a lot of people were ultimately successful—they were granted either full refugee status or exceptional leave to remain. I have no reason to believe that that position has changed. 
 For several years, successive Home Secretaries have told hon. Members that detention should be used only 
 at the end of the process and only for people who are going to be removed. I recall precisely that being said in the Committee that considered the 1999 legislation, which included provisions on detention and bail. Ministers said then that they wanted to ensure as far as possible that detention was used only at the end of the process. We all accept that earlier detention can sometimes be justified—for people who commit criminal offences or who have absconded, for example—but in the main, it is most appropriate at the end of the process. 
 The renaming of detention centres as removal centres indicates far more than just a change of name. It suggests a clear change of policy from using detention at the end of the process when removal is imminent. I am disappointed that exchanges in the debate so far have not revealed the fact that a change of policy is intended in favour of detaining people at the beginning of the process before their claims have even been looked at.

Richard Allan: I was interested to hear the contribution of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), who speaks with considerable experience. I, too, remember during debates on the 1999 legislation hearing many Government commitments to refocus detention on removal. However, the action of refocusing it on removal is currently absent: we have merely a change in name rather than in practice, which is worrying.
 The two Liberal Democrat amendments are designed to assist the Government by refocusing their removal centres on removal. We lost the argument about the name a few minutes ago, so we move on to what the removal centres should do. We simply say that removal centres should be used for removal. 
 We also want to help the Government to meet their commitment to the United Nations convention on the rights of the child by excluding those under the age of 18. The Government gained an exemption from article 22 some time ago, but we continue to challenge that. It is right to criticise and press hard on the issue of holding children in detention. 
 The fact that we want to redefine removal centres should not lead the Minister to argue that we want to let loose many people who should be detained. Our suggestion is that three classes of centre are needed. We need accommodation centres for those normally held in the community, and it is appropriate to use removal centres for removals, but another category of people—not necessarily only asylum seekers—will have to be detained from time to time for various reasons. I await the Minister's clarification of precisely whom the categories will include. 
 People arrive at a port of entry for various reasons, some perfectly legitimate, but the immigration service may not be able to let individuals leave that port. Can individuals who have to be held for a variety of immigration reasons, not just because of asylum claims, only be held in removal centres? Some issues might need to be clarified before an individual can be 
 allowed to go about his business in the UK, and detention might unfortunately be necessary in the short term. 
 I agree with the hon. Member for Walthamstow that detention should be kept to a minimum, but that it is necessary in certain circumstances. I do not want someone suspected of criminality to be set loose in the country. Such a person should be detained while the circumstances are investigated. However, I question whether it is right to place that individual in a removal centre, given that at a later date he may turn out to be entirely innocent at a later date. Perhaps there should be the three categories that I suggested, which include accommodation centres for those going into normal community accommodation and removal centres for those who are to be removed, which is what the Government want to establish. 
 Let us be honest: detention may be required for various reasons. We must make a clear distinction between removal and detention and not make a clumsy attempt to wrap up the two together, thereby creating a large category of people in removal centres who are not about to be removed. The figures show that such people are likely to be at the beginning of the system, not at the end.

Mark Lazarowicz: I endorse the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow about the current use of detention. I have seen far too many cases in which there was no basis in the first instance for someone not to be granted bail or to be detained. I hope that the emphasis placed on the change of name signifies a change of policy. Above all, our discussion shows the need for improvements in the quality of the decision-making process, because bail has been allowed in due course in too many cases. I accept that we are not discussing bail conditions, but in too many cases detention was not justified given the objective analysis of the facts before the decision maker.
 I hope that the Minister can say how we can ensure that the process is changed so that people are not detained unnecessarily. I am worried that one of the downsides of an otherwise good Bill might be an increase in the number of people who are detained when they should not be. I hope that we can ensure that that does not happen as a result of our discussions and the administrative decisions that will follow thereafter.

Humfrey Malins: We have had a useful discussion. Concerns have been expressed by those on both sides of the Committee who are genuinely concerned about the clause. Given that, I do not see a need to press amendment No. 235 to a Division, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.

Richard Allan: I am puzzled. I did not know whether the hon. Gentleman was expecting a ministerial response. I had been looking forward to it.

Humfrey Malins: I did not expect much of the Minister.

Angela Eagle: I was about to respond. I was expecting the hon. Gentleman to add something that he had forgotten to say in his initial speech, but clearly his expectations of me are fairly low.

Humfrey Malins: I apologise. I sought to withdraw the amendment too early. The hon. Lady is always courteous in her responses. I intended no offence.

Angela Eagle: None taken.
 I confirm that our priority for the use of detention space is to support the removal of failed asylum seekers and others with no basis to stay here—generally, illegal entrants and overstayers. That is the main purpose of the detention, now to be called the removal estate. However, members of the Committee are right to point out that apart from detention to effect removal, which includes deportation for immigration offenders rather than asylum seekers, we may detain both asylum and non-asylum cases while the person's identity or claim is established. Clearly, that must be at a beginning of a claim, not at the end. 
 My hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow was right to point out that the immigration and nationality directorate is often faced with people who claim a certain identity that we cannot verify. He mentioned circumstances in which someone claimed an identity of a verifiably dead person and, despite being presented with the facts, still maintained that she was that person. The IND has to deal with such matters all the time. 
 There are sometimes multiple claims using many different identities, which we are beginning to pick up more regularly through our electronic fingerprinting systems. We have fingerprinted asylum seekers for many years, but the new systems allow us to compare the prints with large banks of records much more effectively. The equipment that allows us to do that can be portable in some circumstances. We are picking up more and more evidence of multiple false claims and different identities. 
 It is proper that we detain while we investigate those false claims, and clearly that has to take place at the beginning rather than at the end of a case. There are certainly people in detention whose identities we cannot establish or whose stories we doubt. If we can confirm their identity, they are usually released from detention quite quickly, and they go on into the system in the normal way. Hon. Members will know that there is quite a throughput, which means that giving figures and particular statistics provides only a snapshot of one day. We can also detain because a person is likely to abscond. That can take place at different stages of the claim.

Karen Buck: I have a great deal of empathy with that point, but I am not confident that the people being held in detention fall precisely into those sensible categories. If the Department has statistical information to demonstrate that, it would help to allay fears. My hon. Friend has certainly outlined categories of people that few members of the Committee would challenge, but we would like to see the evidence on which those categories are based.

Angela Eagle: I regret to say—this is as much a frustration for me as it is for anyone else—that the paper-based nature of the casework means that it is difficult to collate the statistics in the way that my hon.
 Friend wants. I can assure her that we are proceeding as quickly as possible with—I dread to use the phrase—information technology that will give us more effective and up-to-date statistics, but at the moment the system is overwhelmingly based on paper files, and without a disproportionate use of resources it is difficult to keep a constant track on the way that the files are circulating around the system. I would prefer to be able to give hon. Members the information that they require, and I hope that help will be at hand in due course.
 The final category of people whom we are likely to detain will be part of a fast-track case processing facility. Oakington is the example of that, subject to whatever the House of Lords decides.

Humfrey Malins: I remind the Minister that I asked about removals in 2001 and the target for 2002. Can she give us those up-to-date statistics?

Angela Eagle: I can give the hon. Gentleman provisional statistics that come with all the usual health warnings. I was about to get on to that, so perhaps he should have had slightly more faith that I would remember his questions. The provisional figure for 2001 is 9,285, which is a 3 per cent. increase on the 2000 figure, a 93 per cent. increase on the 1996 figure and the highest annual figure on record. It clearly falls short of our target of 30,000. That was always an ambitious target, but we are striving to achieve it.

Humfrey Malins: When does the Minister expect to achieve it?

Angela Eagle: We are seeking a step change in the way in which we carry out removals. We are making many administrative changes as well as some of the changes in the Bill to increase the integrity of the asylum process. As I have said before, I firmly believe that there has to be a difference between someone who claims asylum and fails to get either refugee status or other lesser forms of protection, and someone who succeeds. The difference between someone who fails and someone who succeeds should be that the person who fails is returned to his country of origin. That is a vital part of our work to step up our ability to remove people.
 As hon. Members know, removing people according to law, in good order, in safety, and so on, is difficult. To return people to their country of origin requires the consent of the country to which we are returning the people, the issue of travel papers, spaces on airline flights, or in some cases the chartering of our own flight. It is a huge logistical task. 
 We have administered a range of provisions to help reach the target: creating arrest teams—an aspect of which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary discussed on previous clauses; serving determination in person in some cases; the Association of Chief Police Officers protocol which enables us to use the police to arrest people; the expansion of the removal estate despite the setback at Yarl's Wood; the biometric smartcard which enables us to keep closer contact with asylum seekers; the chartering of flights for removals in certain circumstances; and an increased number of 
 departures through voluntary assisted returns. The figure that I gave earlier includes all enforced and voluntary returns. Other means include fingerprinting and closer co-operation with local authorities to see how we can remove failed asylum seekers living in local authority accommodation. 
 There is a range of work across the piece to try to increase integrity in the system once the asylum appeal has been determined.

Gregory Barker: I appreciate the Minister's comments. Is she still confident that the Government will hit the 30,000 figure?

Angela Eagle: We need to remove 2,500 people per month to hit 30,000. One does not need to be much of a mathematician—I am not—to realise that. It is an ambitious figure. However, we are committed to gearing up the system to achieve 30,000. Hon. Members have the figures in front of them.
 The amendments would make it harder for us to achieve the figure, partly because they create a distinction between what we have called removal centres and the decision to rename all detention centres removal centres. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam even suggested that we should have detention centres and removal centres and, I presume, shuttle individuals from one to the other depending on the status of their cases. 
 It is our intention to ensure integrity in the system and effect removals in good order. We will continue to keep immigration offenders as well as asylum cases in detention when there is a reasonable justification for doing so, in the circumstances I outlined. Hon. Members should remember that only a small minority of people are detained. I dispute the suggestion of the hon. Member for Edinburgh, North and Leith (Mr. Lazarowicz) that people are detained almost arbitrarily. I will not say that mistakes have never been made—he may have come across some—but there are opportunities to put them right and we do not take lightly a decision to detain someone. 
 I hope that, with that explanation of how removal centres will be used, the amendment will be withdrawn. If accepted, it would make it harder for us to run an effective removal system and to put more integrity into the system.

Humfrey Malins: For the second time, I rise to say that, for the reasons that I gave, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 The Chairman, being of the opinion that the principle of the clause and any matters arising thereon had been adequately discussed in the course of debate on the amendments proposed thereto, forthwith put the Question, pursuant to Standing Orders Nos. 68 and 89, That the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question agreed to. 
 Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 - Bail

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 234, in page 26, line 22, leave out 'eight' and insert 'seven'.
 This is a short probing amendment. The right of an applicant detained for further inquiries at a port under section 16(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 to apply to an adjudicator or immigration officer for bail under paragraph 22 of schedule 2 to that Act becomes effective after seven days. Why does clause 48 refer to eight days, which is a day longer than the more traditional period that applies in the earlier legislation and in the criminal justice system? No explanation for the increased period is apparent, other than administrative convenience. I should be grateful for an explanation.

Angela Eagle: I hope that I can provide an explanation that satisfies the hon. Gentleman. The transfer of authority to grant bail after the eighth day of detention reflects organisational changes in the immigration and nationality directorate that are part of ongoing improvements in service delivery. The provision is part of the measures to ensure that immigration officers are deployed to best effect—on front-line control and enforcement work. Bail applications need not be dealt with exclusively by immigration officers.
 The transfer of the power to grant bail from immigration officers to the Secretary of State or IND officials will help to ensure that immigration officers can be deployed in enforcement work. The timing of the transfer—after the eighth day—reflects the point at which management of a person's detention is planned to switch from the port or enforcement office to IND caseworkers. It is sensible for the authority to grant bail to be transferred at the same time, rather than a day earlier.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful for that explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 256, in page 26, line 41, leave out subsection (6).

Alan Hurst: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 266, in page 26, line 42, leave out 'cease to have effect' and insert—
'have effect immediately with the coming into force of this Act.'.
 No. 233, in page 26, line 42, leave out 'cease to'.

Humfrey Malins: Amendment No. 256 would prevent the repeal of part III of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and deals with the important topic of bail. I am sure that many members of the Committee are disappointed and concerned about the proposed repeal of those provisions, which provide for automatic bail hearings for detained asylum seekers. The Government accepted the need for such hearings in 1999, but the legislation was never implemented.
 When introducing the then Immigration and Asylum Bill, the then Home Secretary said that: 
''detention . . . is necessary in a small number of cases, but there must be proper safeguards. Part III fulfils the commitment in the White Paper to introduce a more extensive judicial element in the 
detention process. That will be achieved by introducing routine bail hearings for those detained under immigration legislation.''—[Official Report, 22 February 1999; Vol. 326, c. 39.]
 It is a major disappointment to many NGOs in the field that part III has never been implemented. Indeed, the implementation of those provisions may well be necessary to ensure compliance with article 5 of the ECHR, which guarantees 
''liberty and security of person''.
 The Bill contains no alternative safeguards to those in part III, so it is obvious that repealing those provisions will mean that there is no proper judicial oversight of the original decision to detain. That could lead to non-compliance with UN guidelines on arbitrary detention. The Minister may say that it is open to the person concerned to make an application for bail, but in reality that is not satisfactory. The automatic triggering of bail applications that we envisage is a good thing, and should be introduced without delay. 
 I express my regrets—which I think are shared widely—about the provision. I argue for the removal of subsection (6), as that would enable the bail provisions in part III of the 1999 Act to be implemented.

Neil Gerrard: This is one of the provisions of the Bill that I find very disappointing. We had a long discussion in Committee in 1999 about the need for the provision of automatic bail. As the hon. Gentleman said, people may apply for bail in any case, but my experience is that for many people there are significant difficulties associated with doing so. It is often difficult to find adequate legal representation to make a bail application. Also, many people in such circumstances have problems finding sureties, even though there are now some organisations that try to help in providing sureties when they are required.
 When we are dealing with the detention of asylum seekers and immigration detainees, we are generally dealing with people who are being detained on an administrative decision without having committed a criminal offence. No court has made the decision to detain them. We should be as careful as possible to make sure that a person's detention can be scrutinised and challenged. 
 On Second Reading, there were suggestions that bail would be used to frustrate the process of detention and removal. It is difficult to argue that, as that has not happened. Let us imagine the case of someone in detention whose asylum claim has been rejected; whose appeal has been refused by an adjudicator; who has tried to take their case to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and has been refused; and whose lawyer has tried to get a judicial review and has been refused. I can understand the argument that if removal directions have been set and that person is due to be removed in 10 days, there would be no point in a bail hearing after they had been in detention for seven days. I would perhaps have sympathy with that argument. 
 However, that is not what this is all about. It is about ensuring that those who are detained have the opportunity to challenge the decision to detain them. I am sure that some hon. Members will have seen the 
 study undertaken by the faculty of humanities and social sciences at South Bank university, which considered what happened to people who had been given bail. It found that the vast majority—more than 90 per cent.—of those given bail complied with their bail conditions. There is no evidence that when people are given bail they abuse it and do not comply with the conditions. It is also tremendously expensive to keep people in detention, compared with letting them out on bail in compliance with bail conditions. 
 I cannot see the argument behind removing access to bail. We spent long hours only three years ago discussing why it was needed. In the end, the automatic bail hearing was accepted as a Government proposal, but it was never put in place or tested to examine whether it would work. 
 I go back to points that were made during the earlier debate. We are clearly detaining many people who are at the point at which decisions have not been made on their claims. I heard what the Minister said about shifting the process, but there is a long way to go to achieve that. It has been said that detention will occur at the end of the process and just before removal, but we are a long way from that. I know that only a small percentage—about 2 per cent.—of people are detained at any one point, but if one examines the totality of how many asylum seekers have been detained, a considerably higher percentage have been detained at some point during their claim process. 
 I am disappointed by the change to remove what most people considered to be one of the relatively few positive changes that were made by the 1999 Act.

Richard Allan: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. We have sat through the same debates, and he and hon. Members of all parties told the Government why automatic bail hearings were essential if we were to have a system of administrative detention for immigration purposes that complied with the European convention on human rights and commanded respect as being fair. The principle of the bail hearing to check automatically at a reasonable interval whether an individual is detained properly is essential, because in practice individuals are detained for long periods without access to proper legal advice. The bottleneck is caused when people in the legal establishment, whether they work for voluntary sector organisations or pro bono, are not immediately able to get round to see people in detention. Many people were not seen.
 The Government's concession in introducing the automatic bail hearing during consideration of the 1999 Act was significant, and they claimed credit for that at the time. It is extremely disappointing for anyone sitting here three years later to see the withdrawal of the Government's concession before it was ever implemented. One wonders what one must do to make an argument that sticks with the Government, rather than one that they will accept when convenient in order to get a Bill enacted.

Angela Eagle: I do not think for one minute that that thought was in the minds of the Ministers who put
 part III in the 1999 Act. I shall explain in due course why we have decided to repeal it. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not think that the insertion of part III was a cynical ploy to keep people happy, because that is not my understanding of what happened.

Richard Allan: I have clearly watched too many episodes of ''Yes, Minister'' and other programmes that create cynicism about the machinations of Government. I accept the Minister's assurances that there was a genuine intention to implement the provision, and I look forward to her account of why that has not occurred.
 Like the hon. Member for Walthamstow, I understand that if the regime were changed to one in which the vast majority of those held in removal centres had finished the process and were about to be removed, the automatic right to bail might be less necessary. However, the Government have not suggested that there will be a change to stop many people being detained for long intervals without having committed a crime—such people should have their cases reviewed at appropriate intervals. We have a legislative framework for the new concept of removal centres in which the vast majority of people await removal and questions of bail may be less necessary. However, there is no sign that administrative practice will change in such a way that we can expect removal centres to contain only those people. Instead, they will continue to contain many people who are detained for various immigration reasons and to whom bail provisions would apply. 
 It was suggested that lawyers considered alternatives to bail, such as judicial review and habeas corpus, but none proved as satisfactory as the automatic right to bail. That is why Ministers and members of the relevant Committees accepted the logic in 1999. The withdrawal of the provision concerns us. Will the Minister tell us why she believes that it is justified? I will explain our gentle amendment No. 266, which would reverse the sense of the clause by bringing the bail provisions immediately into effect, rather than repealing them. We still believe that those bail provisions should be brought into effect.

Mark Lazarowicz: Hon. Members have received many representations from NGOs and voluntary organisations, which appear to oppose almost universally the provisions that would repeal those in part III of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. I note especially that the UNHCR believes that the provisions for routine bail hearings are essential to safeguard against arbitrary detention. That is why I share hon. Members' concerns. I understand that there are proposals to simplify the general appeal procedures. If so, there may be an opportunity to revise the system of routine bail hearings as part of that simplification process, which I hope the Minister will consider.

Angela Eagle: I shall share with the Committee some of the thinking behind the decision to repeal the routine bail provisions in part III. As hon. Members pointed out, those provisions were never implemented.
 I remind hon. Members that they would have required a first referral for all detainees in the system before the eighth day of detention, and a hearing before the 10th day. They would also have required a second referral by the 36th day of detention, with a hearing by the 38th day. They were not brought into effect, as we have been trying since the 1999 Act to work out the frequency and logistical implications of automatic bail hearings for each detainee. We concluded that it would be a logistical nightmare that would divert scarce resources from processing asylum applications. That would make it harder for us to complete the asylum process as speedily as all members of the Committee want.
 We sometimes have to be open about such administrative decisions, and I intend to be open with the Committee. Implementing the part III bail provisions would significantly increase the burden on the Immigration Appellate Authority. If one listened to some people, one would think that no bail is allowed. Hon. Members have pointed out fairly that bail hearings can be granted under the existing system. Between April 2001 and March 2002, there were 8,498 bail hearings before adjudicators, of which 1,740 were granted. That is with a nominal removal estate of 2,800 places, and 700 hearings a month. It does not include the bail applications to immigration officers, as those records are not kept. We can assume, therefore, that more such applications are made that do not go to adjudicators. Those may be processed routinely and bail granted. 
 With the increase to 4,000 removal places, we estimate that under the existing arrangements there will be 12,000 bail hearings before adjudicators, which puts the figure up from 700 to 1,000 per month. In anticipation of putting part III into effect, we did a great deal of work to try to estimate what the implications would be of routine bail hearings for everybody in detention. We came to the conclusion that that would create a further 2,100 hearings per month. The Immigration Appellate Authority had a total of 74,144 hearings in the period from 1 April to 31 March 2002. Of those, 59,779 were asylum hearings, 8,206 were immigration hearings, 5,271 were visit-visa hearings and 888 were human rights hearings. 
 An average of 5,000 asylum hearings and an average of just over 6,000 appeal hearings take place per month. Were automatic bail hearings under part III of the 1999 Act brought into effect, the percentage increase would be substantial. That is why amendment No. 266, which would bring them into effect now, would grind the system to a halt. 
 We have to be honest and open about these issues. The administrative consequences of automatic bail hearings are substantial. Given the figures and the potential for bringing the whole system to a halt, it was our reluctant judgment that unfortunately it would not be realistic for us to introduce part III bail hearings. We thought it more open and transparent to repeal those provisions, as the amount of available funding and the priorities we have for getting asylum claims through the system would not allow us sensibly to 
 bring them into effect without that having an adverse or catastrophic effect on our system.

Neil Gerrard: Those were very interesting figures, particularly the number of bail hearings that occurred in the year. That tells us something about the figure, which is often quoted, of 1,800 asylum seekers in detention at any one time compared with the number of people in detention at some point during their claim.
 I have looked at the figures and weighed up possible actions. Rather than repealing this provision, have the Government considered keeping automatic bail hearings for people who are detained before an initial decision has been made on their claim, especially if the intention is that detention should mainly be at the end of the process?

Angela Eagle: I hope that we are not mixing up the lawfulness of detention—which can be challenged by judicial review and habeas corpus—and decisions about compliance with bail conditions. The two matters are separate. Judicial review and habeas corpus exist for challenges on lawfulness. We have already had challenges on the Oakington process, which have now proceeded to the House of Lords.
 Detained persons are notified of their right to apply for bail on the form that advises them of the reasons for their detention. They are also advised to contact either the IAS or the Refugee Legal Centre for free advice, and are given telephone numbers and information leaflets when they go into detention centres. To argue that they are ignorant of their rights would be wide of the mark.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for her comprehensive response, and it is helpful to have the facts and figures. I have a couple of points to place on record, although I do not expect an immediate response. First, judicial review or habeas corpus procedures are not a substitute for bail hearings. The Minister accepted that they are different. I hope that she will not suggest that they would provide an alternative, because they are about lawfulness rather than bail conditions.
 Secondly, if individual detainees are to be given reasons for their detention and told about their right to bail, that is a useful step forward from the 1999 Act. The Minister said that there would be huge administrative difficulties if the number of bail hearings increased, so how will it work? If individual detainees want to exercise their right to bail, and do so in increasing numbers, will that not have the same administrative effect as having automatic bail hearings?

Angela Eagle: We are already planning for a substantial increase in the number of bail hearings, and I gave the hon. Gentleman the figure. That will come as a result of the fact that we have expanded the detention or removals estate—whichever description he wants me to use. We are already planning for a thousand hearings a month before adjudicators. The trouble with automatic bail hearings is their inflexibility and the sheer numbers of hearings that
 would be imposed on a system that would already be experiencing increases. We considered those practical issues in great detail and decided, reluctantly or otherwise, that we could not run the system with automatic bail hearings for all detainees. That was our judgment, and we thought that it was more transparent to repeal the procedures in part III of the 1999 Act rather than leave them hanging around on the statute book, never being put into effect. Those are practical decisions that Ministers must sometimes make.
 I was not trying to say that habeas corpus and judicial review are a substitute for bail. As the hon. Gentleman will know from my figures, there are many bail hearings already, and we do not record the ones made to immigration officers. They are not counted but they still happen.

Humfrey Malins: I thank the Minister and applaud her honesty, but I am dismayed by her response. Since when have we sacrificed a principle because of administrative difficulty? We have heard moving contributions from the hon. Members for Edinburgh, North and Leith and for Walthamstow, both of whom agree that there is no need to repeal part III of the 1999 Act. Indeed, there is a strong need to implement it. How can the words of the Home Secretary in 1999, which I quoted earlier, not be valid today? The Minister was frank and said that the implementation would result in a logistical nightmare, but I repeat my question: since when have we decided that something is absolutely right but that we will resile from it because it is difficult? That is no way to proceed.
 Labour Members know that my amendment is right and that not to support it would go against their consciences. They are experienced Members of Parliament and know that it cannot be right for a Minister to say, in terms, ''You may be right on the principle—I'm not even going to talk about the principle—but the fact is it's very difficult.'' If we move into that sort of world, where are we going? 
 This is one of the most serious moments of this Committee. The Home Secretary's words of February 1999 were important. It has been pointed out that many people outside Parliament believe that there is a strong need to implement part III. How can we send a message to the Government that they must do that and not hide behind the shield of administrative difficulty? If something is right, it does not become less right because it is difficult. I therefore urge everyone present to support the amendment, which is the only proper way to proceed.

Angela Eagle: We have not sacrificed a principle because of administrative difficulties. There are already chances to apply for bail, many of which are taken up by people in detention. We have decided not to put into effect automatic bail hearings for all detainees on the eighth day, to be heard in court by the 10th day, or on the 36th day, to be heard in court by the 38th day, because that would mean an increase of 2,100 appeal hearings for the IAA, which currently manages 6,000. That would have major implications for the speed at which we can administer the asylum system.
 The hon. Gentleman cannot tell us that we should be able to hear asylum cases from beginning to end in five weeks and then insist that we have automatic bail hearings at the same time. It simply is not credible. We are not sacrificing any principle. Bail is still available, but I have given the Committee the reasons why we have decided not to put part III into effect. When it was put on to the statute book there were 900 places for detention. We are now moving towards 4,000 places, and the implications of automatic bail hearings in terms of cost effectiveness and speed are too much for the present system. Those who wish to apply for bail can still do so, and in large numbers. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 - Reporting restriction: travel expenses

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 232, in page 27, line 2, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.
 This relates to travel expenses. For the system of reporting to work properly, the person travelling to report should be provided with costs: it should not be discretionary. I want to probe the Government on that point.

Rosie Winterton: I accept the hon. Gentleman's concerns, but I hope to reassure him. As he said, the amendment would require the Secretary of State to meet the travelling costs of those required to report to a police or immigration officer. I confirm that we already meet the travel expenses of supported asylum seekers to enable them to attend their appeal hearing, and that includes the travel expenses of dependants. We also meet the expenses of those attending bail hearings in connection with a family member who is detained under immigration powers.
 The clause proposes that the reasonable costs of those required to report ''may'' be met. Final decisions have not yet been taken, but it is currently proposed not to meet travel costs if the reporting is less than three miles from the person's home. I can reassure hon. Members that exceptions will be made for the elderly, the physically infirm and heavily pregnant women. 
 Some people required to report will be able to fund the cost of travel themselves, but requiring the Secretary of State to meet the travel costs of all 
 those required to report would add considerably to costs. The immigration service is examining several options to deal with the problem of reporting centres that are a considerable distance from some people's homes. We referred in an earlier debate to using mobile reporting centres, creating more static centres and converting some IS offices to multifunctionality. We shall also continue to use the police where necessary. 
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that we cannot fund the costs of all who attend to report, but we are prepared to consider specific cases.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful for the Minister's response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 50 - Induction

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 229, in page 27, line 16, leave out
'without regard to his personal circumstances'.

Alan Hurst: With this we may take the following amendments:
 No. 230, in page 27, line 18, leave out '14' and insert '7'. 
 No. 267, in page 27, line 19, leave out 'believes' and insert 'is satisfied that'. 
 No. 231, in page 27, line 21, after 'location', insert— 
', which programme will include full access to legal advice and representation'.
 No. 269, in page 27, line 27, leave out 'but disregarding section 16(1)(a)'. 
 No. 268, in page 27, line 32, after 'process', insert— 
'and will include access to appropriate legal advice and representation at each stage of the programme'.

Humfrey Malins: We now come to induction. It is important that people's medical problems are taken into account. The clause fetters the Secretary of State's discretion to make allowance for a person with medical or other unforeseeable problems, which could make a residence restriction inappropriate at a particular time, or at any time. In its present form, the clause does not allow the Home Secretary to have regard to personal circumstances. That is why I tabled amendment No. 229.
 Amendment No. 230 raises an important issue of principle about how long asylum seekers will stay in an induction centre, which the Bill states should not be longer than 14 days. We all know that the first few days of an asylum seeker's application are the most important, which is why amendment No. 231 proposes that full legal advice should be available at the induction centre. If a person is to stay for at a centre for many days, it is important that all services are brought into play straight away. Good, quick legal 
 and medical assistance will usually save a lot of time in the long run and create a fairer situation. 
 I was interested to learn that asylum seekers may spend up to 14 days in an induction centre. I tabled a parliamentary question about that issue last Thursday, to which the Minister replied: 
''Eventually all asylum seekers will pass through induction centres. Those seeking National Asylum Support Service accommodation will remain in the induction centre for approximately seven days; whereas those seeking NASS financial support only or no NASS support at all, will remain in the centre for approximately one day—this may, in some cases, involve an overnight stay.
It is envisaged those asylum seekers who are to be housed in accommodation centres in the future, will remain in the induction centre for around two days''.—[Official Report, 9 May 2002; Vol. 385, c. 325W.]
 There we have it. An asylum seeker may spend various periods of time at an induction centre: one day, two days or seven days. 
 I also asked a question about the induction centre at Dover and received the answer: 
''Applicants are housed on a full-board basis. Migrant Helpline and the National Asylum Support Service provide support services daily leading to dispersal within seven days of arrival.''—[Official Report, 9 May 2002; Vol. 385, c. 334W.]
 Two parliamentary answers both say that seven days is the expected period for an asylum seeker to spend at a centre. That is why my amendment proposes that 14 days should be replaced by seven days. It is an important issue. If a person is to spend only a brief period at an induction centre, we should let that be publicly known, because there would be less need for essential services on site. The longer that a person spends at a centre, the more vital it is that those services are provided. 
 Amendment No. 231 would make legal advice and representation available at the induction centres, and that becomes all the more compelling if a person stays there for a longer period, by which I mean anything over a few days. The Minister will understand why the amendments would impose a maximum of seven days at an induction centre and, in addition, would require that legal advice is available. I anticipate that the hon. Lady will say that many people may stay at a centre for up to 14 days. In that case, legal advice and assistance on site will be extremely important.

Richard Allan: Amendment No. 268 is similar to one of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Woking, and seeks to secure access to proper legal advice for asylum seekers. We believe that that would be of public benefit. Plenty of research evidence shows that claims by asylum seekers who have access at an early stage to proper legal advice from reputable agencies progress more swiftly and efficiently than people who go off into the system half-cocked and perhaps receive less appropriate advice later on.
 A key target of the 1999 legislation was to ensure that advice services were the best possible. We want people in induction centres, where those services could be made available and controlled, to be introduced to the right legal advice so that their claims can be processed more effectively and efficiently. 
 Amendment No. 269 would exclude unaccompanied children from induction centres, but would not exclude the dependant children in a family, who may well be in an induction centre as a group. We want to clarify the appropriateness of the induction regime for unaccompanied children. We have concerns about whether it is appropriate, so we want to tease that out by referring back to the definition of an asylum seeker in clause 16 as anyone aged at least 18. We want to remove the exemption so that, in the context of induction centres, asylum seekers are deemed to be only those aged 18 and above. I hope that the Minister can reassure us on those points.

Angela Eagle: I hope that I can reassure hon. Members about the way in which the induction process will work. It is trying to establish a programme for all asylum seekers at the outset of their claim. They will be advised of their rights and responsibilities, and provided with an explanation of what will happen to them during and after consideration of their claim. Providing such information is the foundation of an effective asylum system, and will ensure that everyone knows where they stand and what the next stages are. We hope that the process can then operate more smoothly. Induction is not part of the decision-making process for asylum claims; they will not begin to be decided at induction centres.
 On amendment No. 229, it is important that we have the power to require people to reside close to or in an induction centre, so that we can put them through the process that I have described without them having to travel long distances. The powers in clause 50 are reasonable, because of the short stay that induction is likely to involve. 
 The hon. Member for Woking was right to read out my replies to his parliamentary questions on induction. We do not envisage that large numbers of people will have to stay for 14 days; we are considering a target of people leaving within a week. We expect the stay of people who do not go for any form of NASS support or dispersal to be shorter—a day or two, or possibly an overnight stay. We certainly hope that the rest will go through the process within seven days, but our experience with the induction centre in Dover has shown that, in some circumstances, the stay will extend a little beyond seven days. The seven to 14-day period in the Bill is simply designed to create leeway, so that we do not have to remove people from induction centres who are right at the end of the process if it has lasted slightly longer than seven days. We do not intend people to be left in the centres for 14 days as a matter of policy, and we certainly hope that that will not happen. 
 Full legal advice has been mentioned under amendments Nos. 231 and 268. Again, induction is not part of the decision-making process and does not involve consideration of the merits of an asylum claim. Induction involves giving asylum seekers information about the overall process and their rights and responsibilities. We do not believe that legal advisers need to be present while such information is being provided, although information about legal advice will form part of the induction programme. Before a 
 person leaves, they will be given information about how they can access legal advice in the area where they will be living, if they are to be dispersed, or in an accommodation centre, if they are to go there. 
 People will be given a date for the interview on the substance of their asylum claim, which will normally be held two to three weeks from the date on which they leave the induction programme. All asylum seekers will, if they wish, have the opportunity to discuss their claim in advance of the interview, but we do not intend such interviews to be held at induction centres. We do not think that there is reason to have legal advice available. I hope that, after those clarifications, the hon. Gentlemen are reassured. 
 On amendment No. 269, it is not our view that unaccompanied children should be put into adult induction centres. However, we believe that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children should go through an induction process. We will arrange for that to be done separately, not in centres in which there are 200 to 400 people—that is the size we are thinking of—and which consist almost overwhelmingly, although not completely, of single men, as hon. Members know.

Humfrey Malins: I am mildly reassured—not entirely, but sufficiently to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 270, in page 27, line 36, leave out from 'shall' to 'House' in line 37 and insert—
'not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution in each'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 272, in clause 51, page 28, line 21, leave out from 'shall' to 'House' in line 22 and insert—
'not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution in each'.

Richard Allan: These amendments will be familiar to any veteran of a Standing Committee. They seek to change regulations that can be annulled by negative resolution into ones that require affirmative resolution. It is an important matter of principle for Liberal Democrat Members that regulations that affect the liberty of a person—attendance at induction centres is compulsory—should have proper scrutiny by the House. We believe that that proper scrutiny requires affirmative resolution, which is widely acknowledged to be more comprehensive than negative resolution. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on these modest amendments, which would change the procedure so that we could better scrutinise the Government's regulations.

Angela Eagle: I suppose that the hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear a Minister say, in response to such an amendment, that negative resolutions are adequate. Funnily enough, I think that they are. They are appropriate for what the regulations cover. The Bill sets out the powers for imposing restrictions, and the regulations are confined
 to setting out which dependants are to be subject to those powers.
 Two factors will determine whether someone is to be treated as a dependant for the purposes of clauses 50 and 51. The first and polite question is whether a person wishes to be treated as a dependant—that is, whether they are seeking to enter or remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of their relationship with the principal applicant seeking asylum. If a family is not seeking to enter or remain on that basis, the person will not be seeking to stay as a dependant, and that will not come within the scope of the power in the clauses. We cannot impose any restrictions unless a person wishes to be treated as a dependant. 
 The second factor is whether we think that the person qualifies as a dependant. That issue has led us to adapt a regulation-making power, rather than define the term ''dependant'' in the Bill. There are a variety of circumstances in real life that could produce different kinds of dependants. We aim in the regulations to capture that variety, while retaining the core definition of spouse and minor children, which are not at issue. 
 I hope that the hon. Gentleman will decide that negative resolution is employable. If he objects violently to the provisions, he should keep his eye open for them when they appear before the House.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for that tip-off to look out for the regulations. We will consider those issues again as we go through the Bill, and we will decide whether we think more such amendments are required. However, on this occasion, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51 - Asylum-seeker: residence, ÿ restriction

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 271, in page 28, line 14, leave out '50 and insert '16'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 253.

Richard Allan: The amendment takes us back to the issue of unaccompanied children. I was reassured by the Minister's comments about the induction centre requirements and how unaccompanied children would be dealt with differently. The amendment seeks to align the definition of asylum seeker in the clause with that in clause 16, which, as I have already said, excludes unaccompanied children under 18. The amendment is a way of testing the Government's intentions in imposing restrictions on those who are legally defined as children. It has been a constant and appropriate theme that we continually question the status of children in the system, and I should be interested to know the Minister's intentions. The clause as drafted, in referring to section 50, explicitly includes unaccompanied children in the ability to impose restrictions under the clause.

Angela Eagle: I shall refer briefly to the technical nature of the Government amendment, which relates to the definition of a claim for asylum used in the clause. We want the clause to use the same definition of a claim for asylum as that in clause 16, which is a claim under the refugee convention or article 3 of the European convention on human rights. The Bill contains a drafting error and refers not to clause 16 but to ''that section'', which in the context means section 50, as we discussed in other contexts. It is a technical issue.
 Although children may in general be required to report, we envisage that they will be required to do so less frequently than adults. It is right that they be subject to reporting powers. It would be inconsistent with our wish to improve contact management for asylum seekers if children, whether accompanied or unaccompanied, were omitted from the category of people with whom we kept in contact. 
 The contacts will not be onerous, but as I have said throughout the Committee's deliberations, we hope that they will be helpful. Certainly in the context of unaccompanied asylum seeking children, who are especially vulnerable, we intend them to be helpful, and not onerous or worrisome. I hope that with those assurances the hon. Gentleman will consider withdrawing the amendment.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for those assurances. It would help if the regulations to implement the restrictions made clear the position of unaccompanied children. I am grateful to her for having placed on record her intention to ensure that the reporting restrictions are appropriate for unaccompanied children. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 253, in page 28, line 15, leave out 'that section' and insert 'section 16'.—[Angela Eagle.] 
 Clause 51, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52 - Family

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 227, in page 28, line 29, after 'family', insert—
'in so far as to do so would be in accordance with Articles 1 to 40 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 274, in page 28, line 29, at end insert—
'10B In section 10A, ''a member of the person's family'' shall not include a child born in the United Kingdom before 31st December 2002 to a person to whom removal directions have been given under paragraphs 810 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. 
 10C Where directions are given in respect of a person under any of paragraphs 810 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, directions to the same effect may not be given under paragraph 10A in respect of a member of that person's family if he is a child born in the United Kingdom, who had remained in the United Kingdom for five or more years since his birth.'.

Humfrey Malins: This brief and probing amendment is
 based on the proposition that the decision to remove a dependent child under the provision should be taken according to principles and procedures that accord with international norms in the rest of Europe.

Richard Allan: We support the amendment. Amendment No. 274 is designed to tease out the position of children born to parents who do not have leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The circumstances in which such children can be subject to the powers need clarification.
 The formula that we propose in amendment No. 274 would have several effects. It would prevent the power from becoming retrospective and allow a period for advice to be given, as we believe that this will be a sensitive area. I hope that the Minister will clarify the general point about the UN convention on the rights of the child, which, as I suggested, we support, and the position of children who may be affected by the new power in the clause.

Rosie Winterton: On amendment No. 227, when removal directions are given to an illegal entrant, overstayer or person who is in breach of their conditions, subsection (1) allows the IND to give directions to their UK-born children. The amendment would prevent the IND from giving such directions if they were contrary to the UN convention on the rights of the child. The amendment would undermine the UK's reservation to that convention. The purpose of that reservation is to make it clear that nothing in the convention is to be interpreted as conferring rights on children who do not have such rights under immigration law. Therefore, we cannot accept the amendment, but I hope that the hon. Member for Woking will recall previous debates in which we have said that consideration is always given to children in such difficult circumstances.
 I turn to amendment No. 274. At present, there is no power in immigration law to remove a child born in the UK to parents who are illegal immigrants, or who are port applicants who have been granted temporary admission. The clause will streamline the arrangements for the removal of children born to illegal entrants, or to people who are present on temporary admission. However, the practice of removing such children is not new, and it is therefore unnecessary to protect against retrospective application. Moreover, it might be confusing if different powers could operate where a family has children born either side of the 31 December watershed. 
 We already take account of the length of time that a child has spent in the UK, when deciding whether to take enforcement action against a family group. In 1999, my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. O'Brien) announced that enforcement action would not normally be appropriate where there are children who have been living in the UK continuously for seven or more years. That announcement represented a reduction from the previous figure of 10 years, and we are not persuaded that a further reduction is justified. If Opposition Members are seeking a complete ban on removal of children who were born here and have lived here for 
 five years, the amendment would not achieve that, because there are cumbersome arrangements at present that could continue to operate. The clause merely streamlines them. 
 I hope that with those assurances will persuade the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Humfrey Malins: In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53 - Deception

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 275, in page 29, line 13, after 'uses', insert 'material'.
 This is a threshold amendment—which is another familiar brand of amendment that we regularly come across in Committee. It is designed to ensure that the threshold is appropriate to the penalty that might be enforced. In this case, although we accept that deception may be a justifiable reason for removal, removal is a major step to take, so we seek to ensure that the threshold includes the word ''material'', so that material deception is referred to, rather than simple, bald deception. 
 I wish the Minister briefly to outline her view of the thresholds that will be applied in this deception provision, so that we can be assured that there will be a requirement for substantive evidence to be produced before such a drastic step as removal is enforced.

Rosie Winterton: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be reassured to know that we have looked at his point. However, we consider that the amendment is unnecessary, because it is implicit that the deception must be material. It is not specified that the deception must be material in the current power under section 10(b) of the 1999 Act, nor is that specified in the previous power in section 3(5)(aa) of the 1971 Act. The offence in section 24(a) of the 1971 Act also does not specify that, and neither does the definition of an illegal entrant in section 33(1) specify material deception.
 We believe that to include the word in the clause might cast doubt on the interpretation of provisions where ''material'' is not specified, but we believe that it is implicit that the deception must be material. 
 I hope that that clarifies the matter for the hon. Gentleman.

Richard Allan: Following that helpful clarification, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54 - Exemption from deportation

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 276, in page 29, line 18, leave out subsection (2).

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 254.

Richard Allan: This is one of those matters about which legal advice has been put to us that contradicts that given to us by the Government. We want to know which advice is correct. The Government have said that section 7(1)(a) of the 1971 Act, which is referred to under subsection (2) of the clause, is redundant. The Immigration Advisory Service says that, to the best of its knowledge, the subsection is not entirely redundant and that it is representing several people for whom the distinction between the two formulations is of particular importance to their rights. I am not sufficiently qualified to know the details of such cases, but I wanted to raise the matter with the Minister so that she can be aware that lawyers are representing individuals who are contesting whether the provision is redundant.

Angela Eagle: The Government amendment deals with a technical issue that need not detain the Committee. It is a tidying-up provision and construes section 33(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 in a sensible way.
 I am surprised by the hon. Gentleman's question, given that my legal advice was that the provision is redundant and that no one would have been protected by it. Section 7(1)(a) of the 1971 Act has been overtaken by time and anyone who had protection under that section is equally protected under section 7(1)(b). If worries remain about that advice, perhaps he and I can talk about it another time. I understand that the provision is redundant and our intention under the Bill is to repeal it. It will be repealed whether or not we accept the amendment, but in the circumstances we will not.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for her response. I am sure that those who are more familiar with such cases will be aware of our proceedings and will be in touch with the Minister to explain why they believe that the provision is not redundant. We are grateful to her for tabling Government amendment No. 254, which we support because we have serious worries about the subsection as it is worded. I am pleased that the Government are to withdraw it. I shall not press the amendment to a Division now, because there is some doubt about such matters.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 254, in page 29, line 29, leave out subsection (5)—[Angela Eagle.] 
 Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 - Revocation of leave to enter or remain

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 257, in page 29, line 34, leave out subsection (1).

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 228, in page 29, line 36, leave out from 'deportation' to end of line 38.
 No. 226, in page 29, line 37, leave out 'for legal reasons'. 
 No. 224, in page 29, line 38, leave out 'legal reasons' and insert 'any reason'.

Humfrey Malins: This provision would leave people in legal limbo with no clear immigration status in the United Kingdom. They would be unable to work or to access state benefits and it would be irremovable. Furthermore, it could be in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998.
 Amendment No. 226 would delete ''for legal reasons'' from a fairly meaningless subsection. It is insufficiently explained. If, for legal reasons, the person cannot be deported, it is incongruous to take away his need to remain in the United Kingdom. Moreover, will the Minister explain why the unsatisfactory phrase ''for legal reasons'' appears in the subsection, and the equally unsatisfactory phrase 
''for legal or practical reasons''
 in the next subsection? What is the difference?

Angela Eagle: The amendments are designed either to expand the scope of subsection (1) to cover all those liable to deportation or to delete it altogether, thus preventing indefinite leave from being revoked where a person is liable to deportation but cannot be deported for legal reasons.
 Legal barriers to deportation could include, for example, where a person is likely to receive treatment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR, prohibiting torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, if they are returned to their country of origin. There are no exceptions to article 3, so it applies to all, regardless of whether they have committed criminal offences. Where deportation is prevented by article 3 or other legal obstacles, the power to revoke indefinite leave will enable a further sanction to be taken against the individual concerned. 
 It is necessary to include only legal reasons as obstacles to deportation as only legal reasons could prevent a deportation order from being set. Practical barriers to removal—I hope that this answers the hon. Gentleman's question—such as lack of documentation or difficulty in establishing nationality, are not included in subsection (1), as they would not prevent the issuing of a deportation order, although they might prevent its being effected. Its issue would have the effect of cancelling leave. 
 The revocation of indefinite leave in those circumstances is designed to enable us to take a tougher line against criminals and other undesirables liable to deportation but who cannot be deported for legal reasons. It will send a message to individuals that although their removal may not be possible at that time, their presence in the UK is not guaranteed. It will also express official displeasure at their conduct. The revocation of indefinite leave will disentitle the individual to its associated benefits, such as the right to immediate family reunion—if he has not made use of it already—as well as the assumption of permanent settlement and the stability and security that that entails. The intention will be to remove the individual from the UK if it becomes possible, and revoking 
 indefinite leave may make it easier to do so if circumstances change. 
 Amendment No. 257 would prevent us from taking further sanctions against criminals liable to deportation but who cannot be deported. Amendment No. 228 would leave an incomplete sentence. Amendment No. 226 deletes the same wording as amendment No. 224 and is unnecessary. I hope that, with that brief exploration of what is in our mind, the amendment will be withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 277, in page 29, line 38, at end insert—
''(1A) The Secretary of State shall not exercise any power under subsection (1) unless, at the same time, he grants the person whose indefinite leave he revokes leave to remain in the United Kingdom for a period of not less than the period for which he cannot be deported under sub-section (1)(b).''.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 278, in page 30, line 1, at end insert—
''(2A) The Secretary of State shall not exercise any power under subsection (2) unless, at the same time, he grants the person whose indefinite leave he revokes, leave to remain in the United Kingdom for a period of not less than the period for which he cannot be deported under subsection (2)(c).

Richard Allan: These amendments explore the status of individuals who have their indefinite leave to remain revoked under the clause but cannot yet be removed for reasons specified in two subsections. I am interested to hear what status the Minister intends to apply to such individuals. The indefinite leave to remain may have gone for good reasons, but it would be irregular to leave them with no legal status in the United Kingdom if they have to remain for any length of time. The amendments may not achieve that clarification, but it would be helpful to have an indication of the Government's intentions.

Angela Eagle: I cannot agree to the amendments because they would require us to grant further leave in all cases where it has been revoked because the person is not removable. That would result in indefinite leave being reimposed. Our intention is that periods of limited leave only will be granted to such people. It will allow us to keep their presence in the country under review if the reasons making it difficult or impossible for us to remove them change.

Richard Allan: I am grateful for that clarification and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Humfrey Malins: I beg to move amendment No. 225, in page 29, line 40, leave out ''thinks'' and insert—
''has substantial grounds for believing''.
 We have had this debate before. Many of us find the word ''thinks'' unsatisfactory. The amendment would prevent the arbitrary use of the power. The highly subjective approach in the clause as it stands could create problems on judicial oversight.

Angela Eagle: I said that I would go away and think about that. I have discovered that the insertion of the
 word ''thinks'' is an attempt to have simpler language in Bills, and that the word does not have a different meaning. I am thinking sympathetically about what the hon. Gentleman said in earlier debates, which has consequences on this debate.

Humfrey Malins: In those happy circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 279, in page 30, line 3, leave out subsection (3).

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 246, in page 30, line 3, leave out
'or someone of whom he is a dependant'.
 No. 280, in page 30, line 30, leave out subsection (7).

Richard Allan: I shall try not to detain the Committee for too long on this important issue. It harks back to an issue that we discussed earlier when we talked about people returning to their country of origin.
 I understand that the indefinite leave to remain provisions are lost if an individual goes to another country for more than two years. There are ways in which individuals who choose to return to their country of origin, which is a major target of the provision, could lose their indefinite leave to remain. It speeds up the process by having a formal revocation at an earlier stage. 
 To what extent will the provision make exploratory trips more difficult? Will individuals who have indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom be more wary of engaging in a process of possible repatriation if they consider that that could damage their immigration status? Would a judgment be made that such individuals had the protection of their country of origin although they did not feel overly protected by it because they were in an exploratory phase? 
 A further issue is family visits. Individuals who take an extended family visit to their country of origin could be deemed to have accepted the protection of that country, although it might be only a temporary exploratory phase. Such individuals would be discouraged from returning to their home country although the situation may have improved to the extent that they would undertake a family visit but not be ready to resettle. Fear of losing the ability to remain in the United Kingdom under the provisions could discourage such individuals from maintaining family links. 
 We may require further exploration later in the Bill's progress to satisfy those questions, but I hope that the Minister tell us how the provisions will mesh with sensible intentions to allow individuals to chose whether to return to their home country at an appropriate moment.

Angela Eagle: Certainly, the provisions will not get in the way of exploratory visits home. We mentioned them when we discussed the international clauses.
 The Geneva convention mentions circumstances in which refugee status and protection granted may be cast aside by an individual's actions. The clause ensures that, if appropriate, an individual's actions to adopt another nationality, to return to their country of origin, to acquire a new nationality or voluntarily to re-establish themselves in their county of origin would allow us to end their refugee status. 
 In Britain, indefinite leave to remain is part of refugee status. The clause allows us to revoke indefinite leave to remain so that if people avail themselves of the protection of their original country, we may revoke their refugee status. That is all, and it will not occur in several of the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, such as people exploring whether they could return home. However, we may well revoke the status if we discover that such people have retaken their nationality or re-established themselves in their country of origin while wishing to keep their indefinite leave to remain in Britain that was granted because they became refugees. We should have the right to withdraw refugee status from such individuals, which the Geneva convention grants in such circumstances.

Richard Allan: The Minister's clarification was helpful, especially on the Geneva convention provisions. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 281, in page 30, line 24, leave out subsection (5).

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 282, in page 30, line 28, leave out paragraph (a) and insert:
'(a) only in respect of leave to enter granted after this section comes into force, and'.

Richard Allan: These amendments are also designed to stop the new powers in the clause being enforced retrospectively. Individuals who entered into a particular status under one set of rules should not have that status adjusted afterwards. We therefore propose that the new system should apply to those whose indefinite leave to remain is granted now or later, rather than to those to whom it was granted under the old system.

Angela Eagle: Amendments Nos. 281 and 282 would unnecessarily and inappropriately limit the use of the power in the clause. Amendment No. 281 would delete subsection (5), which allows the Secretary of State to revoke indefinite leave to remain where it was granted before the power comes into force, and where the action—in this case, a conviction of a criminal offence or gaining leave through deception—occurs before the power comes into force. As powers already exist to remove those who fall into those categories, people can expect that they will be deported or removed from the United Kingdom, and that they will lose their immigration status as a result of their actions. It is legitimate to apply the power retrospectively because of that expectation, and because the revocation of indefinite leave is less severe than deportation or removal.
 Amendment No. 282 refers to those whose leave is revoked because they have ceased to be refugees because of their own actions. The amendment would prevent the power from being applied retrospectively to those granted leave before the power comes into force. As there are no powers to revoke indefinite leave or remove someone who ceases to be a refugee, it is inappropriate for the power to apply where those concerned have ceased to be refugees before the power comes into force. However, revocation should still be possible, as leave is granted before the power comes into force, but someone ceases to be a refugee afterwards. As the Bill will have been in the public domain for some time before it becomes law, refugees will also be informed that they risk losing their leave when they seek permission to travel abroad. When refugees ask for a passport to be returned, or for it to be stamped ''no time limit'' to enable them travel abroad, they will be warned that if they return to their country of origin, they risk losing not only their refugee status but their indefinite leave. 
 If we accepted the amendment, we would prevent the provision from having any effect on those refugees fortunate enough to have been granted refugee status before enactment of the provisions, no matter how aware they are of them, or how frequently they return to a country from which they formally established an asylum claim. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will respect the first examples, and accept that retrospectivity is in order in this instance.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for responding so comprehensively. She caused me some concern, however, when she said that individuals whose passports are stamped with indefinite leave to remain will be warned that return to their country of origin could jeopardise their ILR status. We were trying to tease out that issue. I hope merely that it is handled sensitively and that it will be explained to individuals that an exploratory or legitimate family visit will not threaten their status.

Angela Eagle: The Geneva convention is clear on what actions individuals must commit before their refugee status is revoked. Those principles will apply in this case, and people will be told of their responsibilities.

Richard Allan: I am again grateful to the Minister. I simply suggest that bald statements made during the immigration process can cause alarm among people who will want to know what they mean. I have every confidence that the Minister will ensure that the process will be explained in clearer terms than, ''Your status may be threatened''. That concerned me especially, although I understand that that is shorthand for what will be said to them. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56 - no removal while claim for asylum pending

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 283, in page 30, line 44, after 'Convention', insert:
'or Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 284, in page 31, line 5, leave out subsection (4).
 No. 285, in page 31, line 10, at end insert: 
'(4A) In this section the words ''other interim or preparatory action'' shall not include any action which may prejudice the safety of a person who has made a claim for asylum and shall preclude any contact with the authorities in or from his country of origin and any requirement to apply for a travel document of his country of origin.'
 No. 286, in page 31, line 20, leave out subsection (3). 
 No. 287, in page 31, line 27, at end add: 
'(5) In this section the words ''other interim or preparatory action'' shall not include any action which may prejudice the safety of a person who has made an appeal under section 60(1) in relation to a claim for asylum or an assertion that his removal would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and shall preclude any contact with the authorities in or from his country of origin and any requirement to apply for a travel document of his country of origin.'

Richard Allan: Some important issues remain as we enter the last lap of today's sitting. The amendments are significant.
 Amendment No. 283 would extend the definition of an asylum claim to include article 3 of the European convention on human rights on protection against torture and other forms of inhuman treatment. We sought to include that, as it appears to be accepted elsewhere in the Bill as part of the definition of a refugee. It would be simpler to have one straightforward set of protections against removal, rather than to have an individual who was threatened with removal taking an ECHR claim through the courts under the Human Rights Act 1998, as was suggested. That would be less satisfactory than an explicit statement in the Bill that the ECHR and asylum provisions protect equally against removal. 
 The other amendments would overturn the clause, which appears to contain its own work-around subsections. It sets itself up as a clause that protects individuals from removal while their claims for asylum are pending. However, subsection (4) contains large exemptions whereby the Secretary of State can effect removals almost in any way that he wants. The clause is not clear: it grants protection while granting ill-defined exemptions. We are trying to remove those ill-defined exemptions by defining them more clearly. I hope that the Minister will say what those exemption subsections mean. I also hope that she will give some thought to the ECHR provision, which would be better incorporated in the protection that the clause provides, rather than left as a separate legal process that would always be available, but would be unnecessary and cumbersome.

Rosie Winterton: On amendment No. 283, consideration of asylum applications and claims that removal would be contrary to article 3 of the ECHR raise similar issues, but the two are not always synonymous. What applies to one will not always be appropriate for the other. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that we would not seek to remove someone if that resulted in a breach of our
 obligations, but there is a difference between that and an asylum application. Although we will take account of our obligations under the ECHR, it is unnecessary to make explicit reference in the clause. Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, it would be unlawful for the IND to act in breach of a person's human rights. The amendment would not make that any more unlawful, and is therefore unnecessary.
 Amendment No. 284 would restore the position that existed under section 6 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, and would seriously impede the processing of asylum applications. Section 6 was replaced as it was an obstacle to the processing of applications. Under that section, if an illegal entrant applied for asylum, the application was refused, and the decision was sent by post, it was not possible to notify the applicant of his right of appeal because the setting of removal directions triggered the appeal. It was necessary to wait until the applicant had received the notification of the outcome of the asylum application before removal directions could be given. That would still be the case if we accepted the amendment, and is unnecessarily cumbersome. In 1999, Parliament accepted that it made more sense to be able to send the two decisions in the same envelope. We are therefore confused about why the hon. Gentleman would wish to revert to the pre-1999 position. Similarly in a deportation case, if the asylum application is refused, a deportation order has to be made to trigger the appeal to the adjudicator, so we cannot accept that amendment. 
 On amendment No. 285, the Government accept fully the need to safeguard the position of people who claim that they are in danger of persecution in their country of origin. However, we cannot accept that it will never be appropriate to make inquiries of the authorities in the country concerned if they can be done without putting an applicant or his family at risk. Amendment No. 286 is similar to No. 284, but would go far further, as it would apply to any appeal, not just asylum appeals. However, provided that the person concerned is not removed, which is the current effect of the clause, there is no reason why preparatory measures should not be taken. There is no need for everything to stop while the appeal is heard and then start again when it is finished. 
 Amendment No. 287, which I assume is intended as an alternative to No. 286, is also similar to one tabled to clause 56 and again would go further. We do not accept that in a case in which an applicant claims that he suffers from a medical condition so that it would be contrary to article 3 to remove him to his country of origin, there should be a statutory bar on our obtaining evidence from the Government concerned about the available treatment. Also, I do not accept that preparatory steps to document someone whose application for asylum has been refused should be suspended pending the outcome of any appeal. 
 I am sorry that I cannot be more helpful on the amendments, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept my reasons for rejecting them.

Richard Allan: I thank the Minister for a comprehensive response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 - Removal of asylum-seeker to third country

Richard Allan: I beg to move amendment No. 289, in page 32, line 25, after 'asylum', insert—
'provided that a draft of any such arrangement has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.'.
 Our last amendment of the day is a variant of the usual affirmative resolution amendment, as it would introduce an affirmative resolution where there is no resolution, rather than replace a negative resolution, which is the normal variety. A new provision is being introduced over which Parliament should have power of scrutiny, which is that the UK Government can make bilateral arrangements with another member state Government about certification in the context of third country questions. Such questions are normally covered by the Dublin convention, which is a multilateral agreement and subject to scrutiny by appropriate bodies. 
 We are concerned that the bilateral agreements will not be subject to any formal scrutiny without such provision as we propose in the amendment. Therefore, we suggest that when the Government want to make bilateral agreements, which may be entirely sensible, they should be able to do that only subject to the affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

Rosie Winterton: As the hon. Gentleman said, the amendment would make any arrangement with another EU member state for the return of asylum seekers subject to the approval of both House of Parliament. We do not agree that any standing arrangement that we make with any member state should require that approval. The standing arrangements referred to in the clause apply specifically when the member state with which an arrangement has been made has accepted that it is responsible for the claimants' asylum claims. No arrangement under the clause may be entered into unless that condition has been fulfilled, and it is unnecessary to seek the approval of Parliament for arrangements to carry out removals to safe third countries. Given the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the member states of the European Union, they can be regarded as constituting safe countries for all legal and practical purposes in asylum matters. Any such standing arrangements should therefore benefit from the automatic safe third country provisions envisaged in section 11 of the 1999 Act. Given that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

Richard Allan: I am grateful to the Minister for her assurances about how this will work in practice. I accept that the other EU states are also signatories to the European convention and can be trusted on their human rights record. That still leaves hanging the
 fundamental constitutional question of the Executive making agreements without parliamentary scrutiny. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Neil Gerrard: On a point of order, Mr. Hurst. We are still waiting to see amendments to major parts of the Bill dealing with the appeal system. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary assured us that we
 would be given maximum notice of those amendments. Have you had any indication of when we might receive them?

Alan Hurst: I am afraid that that is not a matter on which the Chair can be of assistance. The hon. Gentleman should make inquiries of the appropriate office.
 Further consideration adjourned—[Mrs. McGuire.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at twenty-five minutes past Seven o'clock till Thursday 16 May at Nine o'clock.